Published on April 22, 2025, by TEMPO
By Muhamad Saleh- CELIOS
The formation of Daya Anagata Nusantara Investment Management Agency, or Danantara, was based on Law No. 1 of 2025 on the Third Amendment to the State-Owned Enterprises Law. Further details on Danantara as an institution were clarified in Government Regulation No. 10 of 2025.
After establishing the institution, the government formally announced the structure of Danantara in March 2025, which includes a board of directors, a supervisory board, and an advisory board. As an entity designed to carry out operational and investment holding functions, Danantara manages assets estimated at nearly Rp15,000 trillion (approximately US$982 billion).
On several occasions, President Prabowo Subianto has expressed his belief that Danantara will be under strict supervision from government institutions through the Oversight and Accountability Committee. The committee comprises the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), the Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (PPATK), and law enforcement agencies, including the Indonesian National Police, the Attorney General’s Office, and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK).
The President has also explicitly called for public involvement in supervising Danantara, including organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah.
In hindsight, having BPK, PPATK, the National Police, the Attorney General’s Office, and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) as part of the Oversight and Accountability Committee looks convincing in terms of legality, ethics, and institutional structure. Still, behind this impression lie systemic weaknesses that contain high legal risks.
In a report titled “Legal Issues and Risks in the Regulation of the Establishment of Danantara”, Celios noted several problems. The first was an unclear monitoring scheme.
The problem arose because the State-Owned Enterprises Law did not regulate the existence of the Oversight and Accountability Committee. On the other hand, the supervision of Danantara was entirely under the President’s authority, as stipulated in Article 24 of Government Regulation No. 10 of 2025. The regulation granted the President full authority to determine the supervision model, including the formation of optional committees.
The committee also lacks an explicit parameter regarding its composition, authority, task, and supervisory function. As a result, it remains unclear what the role of enforcement agencies in the monitoring mechanism will be. That includes KPK’s involvement, which has been under public spotlight of late.
Oversight’s complete reliance on the President’s will means no guarantee of true transparency and accountability. This committee can be changed at any time, with limited or even merely symbolic powers.
The second problem was the risk of immunity against the law. Several parts of the State-Owned Enterprises Law indicate risks of immunity for the institution, the officials running their jobs, as well as systemic risk in the financial sector.
Article 3H, Chapter 2 of the State-Owned Enterprises Law excludes Danantara’s losses from state finances. The exclusion could create a grey area in public fund management, including taxes. The norm would instead stunt the effectiveness of law enforcement against corruption, as ruled in Law No. 31 of 1999 on the eradication of criminal acts of corruption.
Within the personal context, Danantara officials also received some form of immunity. First, Article 3X Chapter 1 of the State-Owned Enterprises Law frees Danantara’s officers from the state administration status. As a consequence, they are not obliged to report their wealth through the State Official Wealth Report (LHKPN) system, nor are they subject to the code of ethics of state administrators, and potentially escape the legal trap outlined in Law No. 28 of 1999 concerning clean state administrators free from corruption, collusion, and nepotism.
Second, Article 3Y of the SOE Law offered legal protection to ministers, institutions, and Danantara officers as long as their actions were deemed in good faith and not for personal profit. This provision opens the door to actions that harm the state without clear legal consequences. This can even become a mechanism for avoiding criminal liability or deliberate obfuscation of liability by obscuring responsibility through administrative and procedural pretexts.
On the other side, managing assets of state-owned lenders also poses another risk. Danantara has control of assets owned by Bank Mandiri, BNI, and BRI, whose assets are gigantic and their roles are strategic in the national financial system. However, there has yet to be a regulation that explicitly regulates systemic risk mitigation in the management of these assets, especially in terms of potential default.
As those lenders are considered systemic and highly connected to other financial sectors, the risk can have a significant impact on national financial stability.
The study conducted by Celios and this article are not intended to undermine the existence of Danantara, but rather to serve as an early warning against several fundamental issues that have the potential to erode transparency, accountability, and legal certainty.
If these systemic risks are not immediately handled, the hope for Danantara to become an engine of the economy can instead become a problem.