Muhamad Saleh
Legal Researcher at Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS)
The vacant seat of the SOEs Minister has once again sparked speculation about the future of the ministry. Yet, a more decisive development is unfolding through the legislative track: the draft bill on Danantara has officially been included in the 2026 National Legislation Program (Prolegnas), alongside the Patriot Bonds Bill. With its inclusion, Danantara is moving from a policy experiment to a permanent legal entity with the mandate to consolidate state ownership and investment.
Questions about the relevance of the SOEs Ministry have in fact surfaced since the enactment of Law No. 1 of 2025, which for the third time amended the SOEs Law. This law created Daya Anagata Nusantara (Danantara) as a superholding, reinforced by Government Regulation No. 16 of 2025, which transferred 99 percent of the Series B shares of several strategic SOEs to the new entity. Since then, the center of gravity in managing state assets has shifted toward Danantara, while the SOEs Ministry has gradually lost its function.
Normatively, the SOEs Law still grants the minister broad authority: setting general policies, approving restructuring, and overseeing SOEs’ performance. In practice, however, these powers overlap with Danantara, which now holds ownership and investment management functions. The result is an institutional paradox: the ministry exists on paper, but effective control over state assets has already moved elsewhere.
The Danantara Bill sharpens this paradox. If passed, it would further solidify Danantara’s position, while making it increasingly difficult to justify the ministry’s existence without redefining its mandate. Retaining a ministry with only limited functions risks adding bureaucratic layers, while abolishing it without creating a new oversight mechanism risks weakening public control over state assets.
The biggest problem lies in the weak design of oversight. The SOEs Law does not regulate a Supervisory and Accountability Committee, leaving its establishment to presidential discretion under Article 24 of Government Regulation No. 10 of 2025. The committee is optional, with no clear parameters regarding composition, authority, or duties. As a result, the mechanism depends entirely on the president’s political will and risks becoming a mere formality. There is also no guarantee of involvement by law enforcement institutions, including the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK).
Worse, several provisions in the SOEs Law carve out legal immunities. Article 3H(2) excludes Danantara’s losses from the definition of state finances, weakening the applicability of the Anti-Corruption Law. Article 3X(1) removes Danantara officials from the category of state administrators, exempting them from asset disclosure (LHKPN) and public ethics codes. Meanwhile, Article 3Y grants legal protection so long as actions are deemed “in good faith,” opening the door for evading accountability under administrative pretexts.
This design turns Danantara into more than just a superholding: it risks becoming an entity with sweeping legal immunity. Concentrating public assets in a single body without adequate oversight invites corruption, conflicts of interest, and a decline in transparency.
The idea of merging the SOEs Ministry into Danantara cannot be separated from political economy considerations. By institutionalizing Danantara as a superholding, the executive gains a financial instrument that is more autonomous and less dependent on parliamentary approval. Such consolidation may accelerate business decisions and expand access to global capital markets, but it also narrows the channels of formal accountability previously available through the ministry and the DPR.
This is why SOE reform should not be seen solely through the lens of corporate efficiency. The larger issue is how to ensure that state wealth remains within the reach of public control.
The Danantara Bill should serve as a momentum to clarify institutional architecture, not simply to strengthen the superholding. Options include retaining the ministry with a limited supervisory mandate, creating an independent oversight authority, or enhancing parliamentary scrutiny. What matters most is the establishment of a clear check-and-balance mechanism, rather than leaving oversight to presidential discretion.
The future of the SOEs Ministry, in the end, is only a technical matter. The deeper issue is ensuring that Danantara, as the manager of the nation’s largest pool of public assets, remains accountable, transparent, and bound by the constitutional principle that state wealth must be managed for the greatest prosperity of the people.